Notes from the International Investor view point.

I here for some time argue that broadly US stocks are rolling-over where long bull markets rarely just collapse, instead it's a "slow death" gradually i.e.into a meaningful mkt. correlation -or worse.   

The AI/mega-cap concentration going into this conflict was extreme — the S&P was essentially a 7-stock index with everything else along for the ride. That kind of narrow leadership is fragile because when the leaders rotate or crack, there's no broad base to absorb the selling. The war introduced a genuine macro regime shift: energy costs structurally higher, Fed trapped, dollar volatile, supply chains rerouting. These aren't temporary shocks — they reprice earnings assumptions that before justified 22-25x multiples on US equities.

Compare this to the mechanics of the Thai high dividend yield "invisible hand".  A 7% dividend yield against 0.3-0.5% Thai Bank deposit rates is not just attractive —  it's a structural anchor.  Any meaningful price decline compresses the P/E further and pushes the yield toward 8-9%, at which point the high yield argument here becomes almost impossible to ignore for domestic institutional buyers, insurance funds, and provident funds and others with mandated income targets.  The floor is self-reinforcing.  PRM's (7.60) for example high yield isn't a payout-ratio stretch — it's backed by the FSU segment's stable, contracted cash flows.  That's not a cyclical dividend at risk of being cut when tanker rates normalize or the Thai economy further slows. The midstream-quality earnings underpinning a cyclical-looking yield is precisely the mispricing I've identified.  Again, as some other choices identified here, it's much removed from the slowing lethargic Thai economy.